Abstract: The digital economy has developed rapidly in recent years and has become an important  economic development engine  in the new era.Data,as a strategic resource for the development of the digital economy,in which enterprises can release massive amounts of data information, are playing an important role in data sharing, openness, and development and utilization.However, in recent years, frequent data leakage incidents have exposed a series of issues such as inadequate supervision and imperfect sharing mechanisms in data sharing.Given that data has become a strategic resource driving enterprise value creation,governments around the world are paying more and more attention to the governance of the enterprise data market.In May 2018,the EU enforced the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),which sets out the standards for personal data protection and requirements for enterprise data sharing.In addition,the EU is actively exploring a data pooling mechanism to facilitate data sharing among enterprises.China's Development and Reform Commission (DRC) and many other departments have also encouraged all types of subjects to voluntarily participate in data element sharing by issuing relevant documents and establishing laws and regulations to promote data sharing.The aim is to mitigate privacy risks and hazards and to enable openness and sharing of data.


This study considers big data alliances, members of big data alliances, and relevant government departments, and conducts a theoretical analysis of the effective sharing of decision-making impact data among various entities based on the theory of tripartite evolutionary games.In view of the problems of free-riding by big data alliance members and data leakage caused by big data alliance malfeasance in the process of data sharing,this study constructed a three-party game model to explore the decision-making choices of the big data alliance,big data alliance members,and relevant government departments in data governance,analyzed the stability of the three-party evolution game,judged the stability of equilibriums,combined with the simulation analysis of the data to test the impact of the factors on the stability of strategies,and verified the robustness and effectiveness of the evolutionary results from the theoretical level.factors on the stability of the strategy,verified the robustness and validity of the evolutionary results,and analyzed the mechanism and potential impact of these speculative behaviours from the theoretical level.

The research results indicate that:① Although the probability of big data alliance leakage increases as the value of data information among members of the big data alliance increases, the government's regulatory approach of allocating margin benefits still has a certain degree of governance effectiveness.② The decision-making of big data alliances is difficult to be influenced by social gains or losses, and the diverse governance at the social level lacks influence on the choice of game strategies.③ Members of the Big Data Alliance are highly sensitive to the margin system, and this measure as compensation for data governance can effectively alleviate the phenomenon of free riding among members of the Big Data Alliance.④While evaluating governance measures to improve the data market, the government also needs to measure whether the distribution of profits from margin is fair and reasonable.The tripartite evolutionary game model constructed in this article can provide a certain reference basis for improving the data governance mechanism and promoting the sustainable development of the data-sharing market.These results we got show that the government's adoption of the margin system has a certain constraint on the decision-making choices of big data alliances,and the government should formulate the margin system reasonably and ensure that the allocation scheme of the margin is scientific and appropriate.The members of big data alliances are more sensitive to the security deposit levied by big data alliances,so big data alliances should optimze the security deposit system to cope with the free-riding behaviour of their members.It is difficult for big data alliance to be influenced by external gains and losses brought by the social level in its decision-making process,so it is difficult to influence the choices of big data alliance by influencing its corporate reputation through social opinion,etc.In addition to the government's deposit system,strengthening the construction of internal self-governance mechanism is also one of the effective paths.If a member of a big data alliance leaks information about its members' data,it will quickly attract the attention of the relevant government departments and be governed,while the free-riding behaviour of the big data alliance members is difficult to be detected by the government in a timely manner.Therefore,the internal regulatory mechanism can be strengthened to give full play to the governance effectiveness of big data alliances.

The research in this paper treats the data shared by big data alliance members as homogeneous and does not further distinguish between the difference in data costs of members upstream and downstream of the supply chain as well as the cooperative relationship between members.Therefore,it is the next research direction to consider including both upstream and downstream enterprises of big data alliance members in the model,constructing an evolutionary game model under the participation of upstream and downstream members,and investigating the mechanism of bargaining power in the negotiation of cost-benefit distribution in the co-operative governance among the members on data sharing,so as to put forward constructive suggestions for the realization of effective data governance.