中国民营企业职工养老保险的真实参加情况——来自线上与线下微观调查的证据

The Reality of Social Security Participation Among Employees in China's Private Enterprises—Evidence from Online and Offline Micro-Surveys

  • 摘要: 本文利用2023年和2025年中国企业创新创业调查数据以及2025年第三季度的中国小微经营者调查数据,描述了民营企业全职员工的社保参加情况,评估了社保合规对企业净利润率的影响,并且从员工微观视角分析了不参加企业职工养老保险的原因。本文发现,2024年民营企业中只有47.1%的全职员工缴纳了社会保险;员工规模偏小、位于经济发展程度较低地区以及农业领域的民营企业,其未缴纳社会保险的员工比例较高。模拟测算发现,如果强制企业为全职员工都缴纳社会保险,其平均净利润率会从8.6%大幅下降至2.9%。这表明,对于多数民营企业而言,现行标准的社保成本已接近甚至超过其盈利承受极限,强制合规可能使大量处于微利边缘的小微企业陷入生存危机。员工不参加企业职工养老保险并非完全脱离保障,而是基于制度替代与价值评估的理性选择:一方面,城乡居民养老保险或灵活就业养老保险产生了明显的替代效应;另一方面,受访者普遍认为养老保险的投资回报价值偏低,导致其参保意愿受挫。

     

    Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of social security participation within China's private sector,focusing specifically on the Basic Old-age Insurance for Enterprise Employees (BOIEE). As China utilizes a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system,the participation of the active workforce serves as the linchpin for retiree welfare and systemic sustainability. However,our research reveals a significant compliance gap driven by both firm-level financial constraints and individual rational choices,challenging the feasibility of recent legal mandates. I. The New Legal Mandate and Compliance Pressure The landscape of labor relations in China shifted significantly on August 1,2025,with the release of the Interpretation (II) of the Supreme People's Court on Labor Dispute Cases. Article 19 effectively closed previous loopholes by declaring any “opt-out” agreements betweener employers and employees—even those made voluntarily—as legally void. This move toward strict execution seeks to rectify long-standing issues where the Labor Law (1995) and the Social Insurance Law (2011) were circumvented through informal employment. However,enforcing these standards strictly across the board may have unintended economic consequences for micro and small enterprises (MSEs),which serve as the nation's primary job creators. II. Data Discrepancies and Systemic Bias A major contribution of this paper is identifying the unreliability of official data. By comparing 2022 enterprise annual reports with the 2023 Enterprise Survey on Innovation and Entrepreneurship in China (ESIEC),we found that official records consistently under-report participation. Official data often reflects perfunctory reporting or intentional concealment to avoid regulatory scrutiny,whereas ESIEC data provides a more transparent view of actual operational metrics. This discrepancy highlights a systemic bias in official administrative data,making independent micro-level surveys essential for accurate policy analysis. III. The Economic Impact of Mandatory Compliance Using ESIEC 2025 data,we characterize a private sector where only 47.1% of full-time employees are currently covered by the BOIEE. Non-compliance is most concentrated in small-scale firms,underdeveloped regions,and the agricultural sector. The most striking finding of this research is the estimated impact on profitability. Our simulations suggest that if every full-time employee were enrolled in the BOIEE under current standards,the current average net profit margin of 8.6% would plummet to a mere 2.9%. This suggests that for a vast majority of marginal micro and small businesses,the cost of social security is not merely a line item but a threat to their existence. IV. Individual Reluctance:A Rational Choice? Data from the 2025 Online Survey of Micro-and-small Enterprises (OSOME) explain why employees themselves often forgo BOIEE. The study identifies two primary drivers. First,there are significant substitution effects. Many workers opt for Basic Old-age Insurance for Urban and Rural Residents or Social Insurance for Flexible Employment. Given the high mobility and occasional instability of private-sector employment,these alternatives are often viewed as more accessible or appropriate for their career trajectories. Second,there is a low perceived investment value for the BOIEE as a financial product. Among those not enrolled,56.5% cited high premiums or personal financial hardship as the primary barrier,while another 16.7% expressed concern that they would receive negligible payouts upon retirement. Only 14.5% of respondents actually desired coverage but were blocked by employer non-provision. V. Conclusions The findings suggest that the compliance gap in China's private sector is a complex equilibrium maintained by both firm-level financial constraints and individual rational choices. While the 2025 judicial interpretation aims for a higher standard of social justice,policymakers must consider the fragile profitability of the private sector. Without systemic adjustments to premium rates,better insurance portability,or broader fiscal support,mandatory compliance may protect the rights of the few at the cost of the employment opportunities provided by the many. A sustainable social security system must be built on the foundation of a surviving and thriving private economy.

     

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