Abstract: The U.S. financial regulation has long been characterized by a dual “state-federal” structure alongside a fragmented multi-agency regulatory framework at the federal level. Regulatory bodies have both divided and overlapping jurisdictions,which not only induce regulatory competition and arbitrage but also results in policy uncertainty,high market compliance costs,and inadequate investor protection. These systemic fragmentation issues have become even more pronounced in the regulation of digital assets:the Securities and Exchange Commission （SEC） and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission （CFTC） are engaged in a “turf war” over the classification of digital assets; states have created a “race to the bottom” through divergent licensing rules; and partisan polarization in Congress,combined with lobbying by interest groups,has repeatedly deadlocked federal legislation. This paper focuses on a diachronic analysis of the power struggles and legislative processes among federal regulators and Congress since 2015,particularly regarding jurisdictional divisions and asset classification in digital asset regulation. It examines the deep-rooted causes of the regulatory dilemmas facing innovative financial products under the path dependence of a fragmented system:the principles of separation of powers,bicameralism,and federalism enshrined in the U.S. Constitution inherently generate numerous “veto points” in the legislative process. These veto points significantly increase legislative costs and implementation difficulties,while also making it difficult to eradicate long-standing systemic flaws across sectors. Concurrently,this paper briefly reviews the legislative processes in Japan,the EU,and the UK. A comparison with the U.S. not only deepens our understanding of the factors influencing institutional efficiency—specifically,how the interaction between “historical institutional legacy” and “realistic collective action capacity” shapes legislative performance—but also reveals the differential effects of path dependence and critical junctures in institutional change. This finding holds significant theoretical value for understanding the divergence in the global digital asset regulatory landscape: although technological change is global,institutional responses remain deeply constrained by each country's state structure,regulatory traditions,and politico-economic power configurations, resulting in a pluralistic regulatory ecosystem characterized by “same technology, different systems”.